The Veer and Shoot Arrives in Lubbock Part 1: Mack Leftwich's Vertical Choice Routes

When offensive coordinator Zach Kittley departed to FAU for his first head coaching opportunity shortly before bowl season, Texas Tech head coach Joey McGuire wasted no time in finding a replacement with Mack Leftwich. After setting a host of records in his first 3 years as an offensive coordinator, the 30 year old Leftwich comes to Lubbock with the expectation of carrying on the legacy of high powered spread offenses that have become the hallmark of Texas Tech football ever since the Mike Leach era. Since that time, Tech has traditionally been an Air Raid school (minus the forgettable David Yost years), with Kittley coming off of the Kliff Kingsbury branch. What makes Leftwich's version of the spread unique is its “Veer and Shoot” foundational principles. Created and then unleashed on the Big 12 by Art Briles during his time at Baylor, the Veer and Shoot (or the “Plus One” offense as Briles referred to it) became one of the most prolific offenses in the history of college football and was based on 4 major principles-warp speed tempo, a physical downhill run game, extreme wide receiver splits, and vertical choice routes. Even during an era when the spread had become ubiquitous, Briles’ system was an anomaly. The nature of the offense set itself apart with an unrelenting aggressiveness that author Chris Brown described as “waging psychological warfare against its opponents.” As Briles told a group of Texas high school coaches at a clinic years ago, “We do not go to the body to set up the knockout shot-we try to score on every snap.” After the scandal at Baylor, the offense was placed on life support and nearly became defunct for a few years before it was resurrected on the major college level by Josh Heupel and Jeff Lebby among others.

The Veer and Shoot version that Leftwich brings with him from Texas State certainly isn’t a carbon copy of the original Briles system or even what Heupel is doing at Tennessee. He has built his own unique variation, particularly in the form of an Air Raid flavored drop back passing game he learned during his time with Eric Morris (now the HC at North Texas). Core elements of Leftwich’s system, however, are undoubtedly Veer and Shoot. Wide splits, vertical choice routes, and lightning speed tempo are all central elements of the offense's operation. As Ian Boyd illustrated in this graphic he created and posted in his article on the offense, the Veer and Shoot tree has continued to grow and branch off over the last several years:

Leftwich, from what I can tell, gathered intel on the traditionally secretive system as a result of Texas State head coach GJ Kinne’s time at UCF in 2021, when he came in with Gus Malzahn and possibly learned the offense from Heupel’s staff before they left for Tennessee. Fellow Malzahn disciple Rhett Lashlee also features the deep choice pass game as part of his offense at SMU and previously at Miami:

In an article from the San Marcos Daily Record, Kinne and Leftwich shared their thought process when putting together the offense at Incarnate Word:

“Last year we went into the film room and built out what we wanted this thing to look like,” Kinne said. “We are not really this offense or that offense but we built that thing from the ground up … we see things very similarly so we are going to bounce ideas off one another. He might see this or I might see this and we will talk about it. That relationship has to be really good in order to work together especially when you have a head coach who used to call plays and someone like Mack who is now calling the plays.”

Though both coaches’ mentors have different philosophies, Leftwich was with now North Texas Head Coach Eric Morris, coming with the Air Raid passing attack, and Kinne with Central Florida Head Coach Gus Malzahn’s hurry up run-based attack, it was the run game that both Kinne and Leftwich agreed upon needed to happen.

“It’s something we both dabble in,” Leftwich said. “With the previous regime at UIW, we are an up-tempo offense to throw the ball. Kinne had been with Gus Malzahn in the past so he was familiar with the tempo aspect of things. Being an offensive lineman’s son, I definitely have an affinity for running the football. I believe if you want to play championship football, it comes with toughness and being able to run the ball when it’s fourth and one and we need a yard. We need to be a physical team.”

With an agreement on their strategy, it was now up to fitting their plan of attack around their players.

“So we saw eye to eye there; then we were, ‘How do we build this thing?’” Leftwich said. “We have a really good offensive line, good running backs who can make plays, and a quarterback who is dynamic so how do we build this thing around the run game. That led to the wide splits and the tempo which created problems for the defense which we wanted.”

During Leftwich’s first year as the offensive coordinator, Incarnate Word had the top ranked offense in division I and led the FCS in scoring with 51 points and 581 yards per game. His offenses at Texas State were ranked 1st in the Sun Belt and in the top 15 nationally in both 2023 and 2024, averaging 36 points per game while utilizing a balanced run/pass game distribution. Leftwich has also developed a penchant for developing quarterbacks, as he was responsible for recruiting and developing future #1 draft pick Cam Ward and his QB Lindsey Scott who won the Walter Payton Award (FCS version of the Heisman) in 2022 after throwing for 4,684 yards and 60 touchdowns. His quarterbacks at Texas State set school records for passing yards, touchdowns, and completion percentage.

Turn on the tape of Leftwich’s offenses and much like other Veer and Shoot teams of both the past and present, their defining feature is explosiveness. Frenetic tempo in combination with wide splits and a vertical run game put immense pressure on defensive structures. There is no Schrodinger's cat defender, and the offense’s extreme horizontal spacing forces the defense into a pick your poison type of situation. As AJ Forbes demonstrated in his excellent book on the offense, the uber wide splits of the receivers separates the defense into 3 maximally spaced out areas they must defend-the core and the perimeter to each side:

This sideline to sideline configuration truly utilizes all 53 ⅓ of the field’s width and makes it practically impossible for the defense to adequately hide their intentions pre-snap or play anything but pseudo man coverage. Combined with extreme tempo that forces the defense to get set quickly, quarterbacks are presented with clear coverage pictures and large throwing windows to execute the system’s signature deep choice passing game. What makes choice routes so deadly and why Baylor was able to use them to torch defenses during the Briles era is that they allow receivers to adjust their route post snap to attack the coverage at its weakest point. This Run and Shoot-esque feature grants the offense the upper hand in that it can morph into the best answer based on what the defense does, or in the words of legendary Run and Shoot coach Mouse Davis, “always have the chalk last.” The onus is then on the player to make the correct decision instead of always relying on the coach to end up in the perfect play call. The genius of Art Briles’ creation was taking this philosophy and then making it an ultra-simple read for the quarterback. Instead of a Run and Shoot style passing attack where the QB progresses through multiple receivers with adjustable routes, choice gives him one read and tells him exactly who to throw the ball to. One “choice” receiver is isolated while the other routes to that side of the field are designed to divert the defense’s attention and ensure that he is left in a one on one situation.

In its most basic form, the choice receiver’s rule is to sprint like his hair is on fire through 10 yards and then react off of the depth and leverage of his defender. The specific rules and verbiage vary slightly depending on which Briles disciple you talk to, but essentially at 10 yards he reaches his decision point and can either retrace back down his stem, continue vertical, or run a post. If his defender is playing off coverage he runs the retrace curl. If his defender is playing tight (if he’s even I’m leaving is a popular coaching point for this) he continues vertical. Depending upon the depth and leverage of the corner and safety, he also has the freedom to snap his route off into a skinny post. The choice variation diagrammed below is referred to as outside choice:

The slot receiver lined up to the inside of the choice runner runs a bender or “capture” route, which is designed to draw the attention of the safety and overhang and prevent them from helping the corner defend the choice route. The slot outside releases the overhang, clears the underneath coverage, and snaps his route off into a bender in front of the safety in an effort to “capture” both defenders.:

Here is Baylor during the Briles era running outside choice:

If the overhang buzzes outside to get underneath the choice, the slot will immediately “wrap” his route and sit in the vacated space for a quick throw:

The quarterback is taught to anticipate throwing the curl and then reacts to throw the vertical or post conversion. The only time he throws the bender is if the safety widens to cover the vertical conversion of the choice or if the overhang flies out into the curl window. The bender is viewed as more of a check down route if the defense overplays the choice and leaves the middle of the field open. This is just one example of the many different ways choice was implemented, as it could be tagged to any receiver. The other receivers next to the choice would then by rule know which ancillary route they were supposed to run. For example, out of a trips formation, the #3 receiver (2 in Briles terminology) on outside choice runs a vertical to the opposite hash strictly just to hold the weak safety-he is not in the progression:

If the defense started getting a safety involved and began overplaying outside choice, the most obvious counter punch from the offense would be to simply tag the slot receiver on the choice route, who now makes his break decision off of the safety’s movement. The outside receiver next to the slot choice runs a deep stop to prevent the corner from falling in on the choice:

This is the beauty of choice-the quarterback simply reads one receiver who adjusts his route to defeat the coverage at its weakest point. Against cover 3 the slot would most likely continue vertical up the seam, against cover 2 he can stick to a post and cross the safety’s face, and against a quarters safety he can’t beat deep, he can simply curl it up (against quarters outside choice is a better call). Against man coverage he even has the ability to bend the route outside into a slot fade and work into the open space behind the corner. It is important to note that the receiver running this route may not be cognizant of the coverage being played and doesn’t have to be. He is simply finding open grass and reacting off of the depth and leverage of the defender over him.

When choice is called to a lone receiver, (called single choice), the choice runner is now isolated by virtue of the formation against the corner. This is an ideal call against a 1 high safety structure where there is a one on one opportunity and no overhang defender that can get underneath the throw:

The backside routes can be a variety of different things-quick game, drop back, or even other choice concepts are all popular pairings that allow the QB to choose which half of the field he is going to work based off of the movement of the weak safety, match up, etc. At Baylor, Art Briles sometimes preferred that his backside receivers run “hangout” routes to persevere their legs since they weren’t going to get the ball or affect the play anyways.

Outside choice and single choice are both base concepts in Leftwich’s offense. He typically runs his version of outside choice mirrored from 2x2:

As described above, the design of the play is to capture the safety and overhang with the bender and leave the choice route one on one with the corner. From my interpretation of the film and without access to the Texas State playbook, from what I can tell the quarterback reads it like the traditional Briles system outside choice. He will pick a side based on matchup or numbers, then go choice to checkdown. It is possible that the slot has the freedom to break to a post if the safety widens in a cover 2 look, which the QB would most likely be alerted to pre-snap and then read the play inside-out. Outside choice also appeared to be one of Texas State’s “gas” plays, which are a set of predetermined one word play calls Veer and Shoot teams will carry into a game. The clip below is the perfect microcosm of what makes Leftwich’s offense so difficult to defend. In the previous play, Texas State ripped off an explosive GT counter play to the running back, then immediately lined up in 2x2 to run outside choice. Lamar’s defense gets caught trying to sub and doesn’t get lined up in time. The outside receiver to the boundary runs right by the flat footed cornerback for a 34 yard touchdown:

Here against a quarters look, the cornerback to the boundary bails, so the outside receiver retraces back down his stem. The QB most likely worked to this side because he saw a 2 high shell pre-snap with the backers bumped to the field and no overhang to the boundary:

Hitting outside choice against field rotation cover 3 with a bailing corner:

Against Arizona State, the Sun Devils get in cover 1 and bring pressure. The receiver to the boundary is facing press so he takes his choice route vertical:

3 plays later in the same drive they use a constraint play designed for when the corner starts to jump the choice. The outside receiver to the boundary runs a choice and go against cover 1 for a touchdown pass:

When running single choice, they often paired it with slot fade to the field and 7 man protection:

Typically when single choice is paired with another concept, the quarterback will be taught to read the weak safety and work opposite of his movement. Here against Baylor pre-snap, the nickel cheats down to the line in a pressure look and the strong safety creeps down over #2. The free safety in the deep middle immediately works to the wide side of the field on the snap, indicating to the QB a one on one matchup for the choice. The boundary corner bails and the receiver snaps his route off underneath. His wide split makes it impossible for the OLB walked up on the line to get underneath the throw:

2 plays later on the same drive, Texas State runs the exact same play. This time, the free safety is positioned to the boundary outside of the hash pre-snap. The nickel again moves down off the edge and the strong safety rolls down over #2. This gives a clear picture to the quarterback to work the slot fade side knowing he is most likely getting field pressure with tight man coverage and that the free safety can’t get there in time to help. On the snap, the choice runner is getting pressed so he continues vertical, while the free safety works to the wide side of the field. With the extreme splits of the receivers, he is too far out of position to help with the slot fade throw:

Same single choice/slot fade variation vs Arizona State in cover 1. The boundary safety blitzes off the edge and the QB knows the choice is singled up:

Against UTSA, Texas State ran outside choice and single choice together, popularly known in the Briles system as “bomb”:

The QB was most likely keying the weak safety-although there was no field rotation, he was flat footed on the snap. With no overhang threat underneath, the QB works single choice:

In part 2, we will look at Leftwich’s favorite version of choice-switch verticals.